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During a recent visit to Belfast, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson described the
Good Friday Agreement' (or "Agreement") as
[c]onspicuous by the centrality it gives to equality and human
rights concerns. Few documents emerging from divisive and
difficult political negotiations have so well captured the im-
portance of fairness in creating right relationships. In its
preambular paragraphs, throughout the text, and indeed in
all the new institutions and mechanisms established as a re-
sult of the Agreement, concerns around fairness and justice
are a recurring theme.2
The High Commissioner said that the special nature of the
Agreement was not restricted to its conceptualization. "This
carefully crafted document arose as a result of political parties of
very different political persuasions recognizing and endorsing
principles of impartiality, accountability, equality, fairness and
pluralism."'
These comments underline the quite remarkable extent to
which the Agreement placed human rights at its center. A peace
* This Essay was authored by Paul Mageean and Martin O'Brien of the Committee
on the Administration ofJustice ("CAJ"). The CAJ is a Belfast-based human rights non-
governmental organization ("NGO"), which works for a just and peaceful society in
Northern Ireland where the rights of all are respected and protected. The views
expressed are not necessarily those of CAJ.
** Legal Officer of the Committee on the Administration of Justice.
*** Director of the Committee on the Administration of Justice.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Good Friday Agreement]. The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations
("Good Friday Agreement" or "Agreement") was signed on April 10, 1998, at Belfast,
Northern Ireland. The Agreement was agreed upon by representatives of the two gov-
ernments and eight of the ten parties entitled to take part in the negotiations.
2. Mary Robinson, Equality and Human Rights-Their Role in Peace Building,
Speech at the Stormont Hotel (Dec. 2, 1998).
3. Id.
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process designed to resolve a centuries-old jurisdictional conflict
obviously addressed constitutional issues and increased cross-
border cooperation, but the specific detail with which human
rights issues were addressed is convincing evidence of a sea-
change in the way the major players approached the resolution
of the conflict.
This Essay examines the process by which the language of
human rights moved to center stage in the political process. It
looks to peace processes elsewhere to determine whether the
Agreement is deserving of the High Commissioner's special
praise and analyzes, from a human rights perspective, the con-
tent of the Agreement and the extent to which the promises
made therein have been fulfilled to date.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE
In the aftermath of the IRA and loyalist cease-fires in the
summer of 1994,4 the human rights community in Ireland and
Britain keenly felt the expectation that was shared by the com-
munity in general that an unexpected and, in many ways an un-
precedented, opportunity for change existed in Northern Ire-
land. A new departure was anticipated from the traditional reli-
ance on emergency legislation and a highly militarized police-
force that had characterized the state's response to internal dis-
sent for most of this century.5 While the human rights commu-
nity had long campaigned for improvements in the human
rights situation, the new security situation challenged the as-
sumed rationale on the part of the government for its continued
reliance on emergency laws and practices that had been found
to have violated international human rights law.6 The rationale
for such measures had now gone, and with it, the reasoning
went, the exclusion orders, the detention centers,7 the extra-ju-
4. The Irish Republican Army ("IRA") cease-fire was declared at the end of August
1994 and was followed approximately one month later by cease-fires of the two main
loyalist paramilitary groupings, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer
Force. The IRA cease-fire broke down in February 1996 but was restored in July 1997.
5. See MICHAEL FARRELL, THE ORANGE STATE (1980).
6. The United Kingdom adopted this approach in the case of Brogan and Others v.
United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 16 (1988), and its subsequent derogation
from Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"), and in the case of Brannigan and
McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1993).
7. Detention centers -are used for the interrogation of those arrested under the
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dicial killings, and the effective immunity that members of the
security forces enjoyed in relation to theseviolations. This opti-
mistic and expectant analysis was articulated in a statement is-
sued on International Human Rights Day, December 10, 1994,
by five of the leading human rights groups in these islands. In
the Declaration on Human Rights, the Northern Ireland Con-
flict and the Peace Process ("Declaration" or "Human Rights
Declaration"), the Committee on the Administration of Justice
("CAJ"), Liberty, the Irish Council of Civil Liberties, the Scottish
Council of Civil Liberties (now the Scottish Centre for Human
Rights), and the British-Irish Rights Watch echoed the hopes of
the wider community in declaring that "at this historic moment,
there is a unique opportunity to put in place new structures
which will defend and promote human rights."'
The groups called for the recognition, on the part of all
those involved in negotiating a new political framework in
Northern Ireland, of the centrality of human rights in the search
for a just and lasting peace. New systems of justice were called
for that would address the injustices of the past and ensure
proper investigation of future violations. These systems in-
cluded a Commission on Policing, which would produce a
model of policing that would be representative of all sections of
the community in Northern Ireland and command the confi-
dence of the community, a fully-independent system for the in-
vestigation of police complaints, the introduction of a Bill of
Rights, an overhaul of the criminal justice system, a Commission
of Investigation to examine human rights abuses arising from
the emergency legislation, and the introduction of human rights
Prevention of Terrorism Act. Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) Act,
1974, ch.56 (Eng.). There are three detention centers currently in use in Northern
Ireland; one is in Castlereagh in Belfast and the others are in Derry and Armagh. The
conditions in all three, but particularly Castlereagh, have been the focus of regular
criticism by international human rights bodies and NGOs since the 1970s to date. Such
bodies have expressed concern at the ill-treatment of detainees in the centers and in
1993, a visiting delegation from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture
concluded that those detained in Castlereagh faced a significant risk of psychological
ill-treatment and occasional physical assault. Final Response of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment to the Report of the European Committee on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its Visit to the United Kingdom from 15 to 31 May
1994, CPT/Inf (96) 12 (1996). •
8. COMMITrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ET AL., DECLARATION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE PEACE PROCESS (1994).
1502 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1499
education into the school curriculum.9 The Declaration also de-
manded the end of all forms of discrimination and the strength-
ening of anti-discrimination legislation. 0
The Human Rights Declaration was followed up by further
action by the human rights community in general, and the CAJ
in particular, to ensure that key actors in the political process
were engaged with the human rights agenda. In January 1995, a
seminar was held under Chatham House rules in Belfast, to
which influential policy-makers and senior officials from the
Irish and British Governments were invited. The ideas con-
tained in the Declaration were debated, including concepts that
later appeared almost unchanged in the Agreement, including a
Commission on Policing and a Criminal Justice Review and new
measures to promote equality.
Building on this in March 1995, a public conference was
held in Belfast to discuss the implications of the peace process
for human rights. The keynote address was given by John Shat-
tuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor in the United States Administration. Again,
the attendance list included the British and Irish Governments,
representatives of the United States Government, many of the
local political parties, victims of human rights violations, and a
broad cross section of civil society. Its objective was to mobilize a
broader support base for the Human Rights Declaration. Since
then, the centrality of rights to the peace process has been the
mantra of the human rights community and has been advanced
on a consistent basis in press briefings, meetings with govern-
ments and others, and submissions to international human
rights fora. 1
An examination of the human rights aspects of the Agree-
ment reveals that to a significant extent the proposals from the
human rights community made in the 1994 Declaration have
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See generally COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CAJ SUBMISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE.AGAINST TORTURE (1998). Indeed on April 1, 1998,
ten days before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers issued a highly critical report
in relation to intimidation of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland. In his report, he
echoed the language of the NGOs when he said that he was making his recommenda-
tions "with the conviction that respect for the rule of law and human rights ... will
enhance the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict."
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been met, and there is little doubt that the broad agenda that
the non-governmental organization ("NGO") community was ar-
ticulating emerged onto the political agenda in Northern Ire-
land. Until the weeks before the Agreement, it appeared that
the political agenda and that of the peace process were primarily
focused on other matters. Indeed, the NGOs were disappointed
with the lack of importance attached to human rights matters
during the first stage of the peace process up to the breakdown
of the IRA cease-fire in February 1996. Given the centrality af-
forded to human rights issues in the final Agreement, it is impor-
tant to explore the reasons for the apparent shift in attitudes of
some of the key players that led to rights issues taking center
stage in the peace process little more than two years later.
II. FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM
A. Republicanism, Nationalism, and the Irish Government
Perhaps least surprising is the weight that the nationalist
participants in the process attached to the protection of rights.
The experience of the nationalist community within the state of
Northern Ireland was forcefully articulated in the language of
rights as early as the beginning of the current conflict. Indeed,
many would say that the violence of the state's reaction to that
expression of discontent led to the re-birth of militant republi-
canism and the subsequent violence. 12 During the course of the
conflict itself, it has primarily, though not exclusively, been
members of the nationalist community who have suffered regu-
lar human rights violations by the state. 1 Although republicans
occasionally viewed aspects of the rights agenda as a distraction
from their main task of removing the British presence from Ire-
land,14 since the late 1980s Sinn F~in has increasingly used the
12. See GERRY ADAMS, PATHWAY TO FREEDOM (1995); BOB PURDIE, POLITICS IN THE
STREET (1990).
13. For instance, an analysis of those killed at the hands of the security forces dur-
ing the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland shows that 89.6% of the victims were
from the nationalist/catholic community, which, according to the 1991 census, made
up 38% of the population of Northern Ireland.
14. David Schmitt, The Consequences of Administrative Emphasis in Equal Op-
portunity Strategies: Comparative Analysis of the United States and Northern Ireland,
Speech prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
(Sept. 3-6, 1981).
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language of rights in its literature.15 However, the republican
focus on the human rights agenda became more obvious in the
period immediately before and during the negotiations. It is
likely that there were two reasons for this focus: an acceptance
that immediate change in terms of jurisdictional control over
Northern Ireland was unlikely, and a degree of satisfaction with
statements from the British government that it no longer had
any selfish strategic or economic interest in staying in Northern
Ireland. Many in the republican community argued that this un-
precedented statement, while hardly tantamount to a declara-
tion of intent to withdraw from Northern Ireland, nevertheless
was extremely significant and would never have been made in
relation to a region of Britain. These factors, combined with the
knowledge that cross-border bodies would emerge from the
talks, probably served to sharpen the republican focus on the
rights agenda so that their support base would experience real
change in what they identified as the interim period before their
ultimate goal of Irish unity.
The Irish government has, over a long period, identified the
issue of rights as being central to the conflict in Northern Ire-
land. For example, an analysis of speeches of the Irish govern-
ment to the General Assembly of the United Nations reveals that
in every speech from 1969 until 1977, and'from 1987 until 1991,
the denial of rights was mentioned as contributing to the con-
flict.1 6 From 1991 on, the Irish government appeared to be
more reluctant to identify human rights violations as one of the
main problems during the first stirrings of the peace process.
This reluctance may have been because of an improvement in
relations between London and Dublin, and also perhaps because
the Irish government felt that their concerns on these issues
were being adequately addressed under the aegis of the Anglo-
Irish Agreement, 17 thus avoiding the need to raise the issues in a
15. See SINN FEIN, TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE IN IRELAND, SINN FEIN MANIFESTO FOR
THE WESTMINSTER ELECTION APRIL 1992 (1992).
16. Martin O'Brien, Northern Ireland at the United Nations 1969-1996 (1996)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Queen's University of Belfast).
17. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir., Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREE-
MENT 15-48 (1989) [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement]. The Anglo-Irish Agreement
of 1985 was the first of a series ofjoint declarations to be undertaken by the British and
Irish governments in relation to Northern Ireland. The Agreement provoked wide-
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public international forum.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 is believed by some
commentators"' to have been the genesis of the peace process.
In it, both governments reaffirmed their commitment to a soci-
ety "free from discrimination and intolerance, and with the op-
portunity for both communities to participate fully in the struc-
tures and processes of government." 9 The intergovernmental
conference that was set up under Article 2 of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement was given the remit of dealing with "legal matters,
including the administration of justice. '20 Matters to be consid-
ered by the intergovernmental conference under Article 5 in-
clude "the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and
the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some
form in Northern Ireland. '21 Article 7, dealing with security and
related matters, accepts that there is a need for measures to im-
prove relations between the security forces and the community.
The measures envisaged include improvements in arrangements
for handling complaints and action to increase the proportion
of members of the minority in the RUC. 22 There is also recogni-
tion in Article 8 of the importance of public confidence in the
administration of justice. 3
Concern with rights continues to be a feature of the docu-
ments drafted by both governments. For example, the Joint
Declaration made at Downing Street on December 15, 1993, in-
cludes the acceptance on the part of the then Taoiseach, Albert
Reynolds, that the exercise of the right of self-determination on
the part of the Irish people must
respect the democratic dignity and the civil rights and reli-
gious liberties of both communities, including:
* the right of free political thought;
* the right of freedom and expression of religion;
* the right to pursue democratically national and political
aspirations;
spread Unionist opposition mainly because it recognized the right of the government
in Dublin to have an input into the governance of Northern Ireland for the first time.
18. See EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID McK TrRPCK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE (1996).
19. See Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl.
20. Id. art. 2.
21. Id. art. 5.
22. Id. art. 7.
23. Id. art. 8.
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* the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and
legitimate means;
* the right to live wherever one chooses without hindrance;
* the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic
activity, regardless of class, creed, sex or colour.
These rights would be reflected in any future political
and constitutional arrangements emerging from a new and
more broadly based agreement.
24
These provisions are repeated almost verbatim in the Framework
Documents. 25 The Framework Documents add that both gov-
ernments would encourage the adoption of a charter or cove-
nant that might reflect and endorse agreed measures for the
protection of the fundamental rights of all those living in Ire-
land. Each government also undertakes to ensure the systematic
and effective protection of common rights. 26 The British gov-
ernment, of course, was also a signatory to these agreements, but
given the content of both the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the
Framework Documents, it is widely believed that the Irish gov-
ernment was the driving force behind both documents. The An-
glo-Irish Agreement in particular also bore the imprimatur of
the Social Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"), the largest
nationalist party in Northern Ireland.2 7
The SDLP frequently made reference in its election litera-
ture to the importance of rights, although its primary focus has
been in attempting to resolve the conflict not through the
human rights paradigm, but through persuading the two govern-
ments to build institutions that reflected the two main traditions
24. The Joint Declaration by An Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, T.D. & The Brit-
ish Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P., Dec. 15, 1993, U.K.-Ir., Cm. 2442
[hereinafter Downing Street Declaration].
25. A New Framework for Agreement, Dec. 1994, 34 I.L.M. 946 [hereinafter
Framework Documents]. The Framework Documents were issued in December 1994
by the Irish and British governments and outlined a shared understanding of future
political arrangements on the island of Ireland and between Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
26. See id.
27. Indeed, in a Social Democratic Labour Party document entitled "The Positive
Approach," the SDLP asserted its role as the "inspiration for every major advance to-
wards agreement over the last three decades." SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY, THE
POSITIVE APPROACH (1997). In its 1997 election manifesto, it also included detailed
objectives in the human rights sphere including the repeal of emergency legislation,
the withdrawal of plastic bullets, transfer of prisoners, etc. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LABOUR
PARTY REAL LEADERSHIP, REAL PEACE (1997).
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in Northern Ireland. The history of the party's involvement in
the human rights agenda is a complex one. Senior members of
the party including the party leader, John Hume, were centrally
involved in the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. To an
extent, therefore, the party emerged from that movement. How-
ever, since the emergence of Sinn F~in in the early 1980s, the
support base of the SDLP has become increasingly middle class.
That constituency has generally not been at the sharp end of
human rights violations and therefore the motivation, in base
political terms, to work on these issues has decreased. However,
the party has certainly recognized the potential of human rights
violations to increase support for republicanism, and it is per-
haps in that context, and that of the past experience of key
members of the party's leadership, that much of their work on
these issues can be placed.
B. Unionism, Loyalism, and the British Government
The election of a new British Government in May 1997 did
effect a discernible change in the public attitude of the British
government toward the human rights agenda. First, the new La-
bour administration made human rights a cornerstone of its for-
eign policy.28 The Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in a major
speech in July 1997, adopted twelve new policies that, he
claimed, would put into effect the Labour Government's com-
mitment to human rights. The twelfth of these policies was pet-
haps the most significant in terms of improving the human
rights situation in Northern Ireland. The Foreign Secretary ac-
cepted that if "Britain is to carry credibility when we talk to other
governments about their observance of human rights, we must
command respect for our own human rights record. '29 Second,
Labour in opposition had on occasion taken a relatively progres-
sive approach to human rights issues in Northern Ireland. The
Labour party conference had voted to ban the use of plastic bul-
lets,3 0 and for many years Labour had voted against the renewal
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act because it violated basic
human rights standards and required that the United Kingdom
28. LABOUR PARTY, HUMAN RIGHTS INTO A NEW CENTURY (1997).
29. Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, Speech at the Labour Party Conference (July
1997).
30. Id.
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derogate from the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR" or "Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights") in respect to its seven day
detention powers. Although, as it neared government, the party
moved to a position of abstention on this issue, it was clearly
more likely to be persuaded by human rights arguments than its
predecessor. Indeed, the shadow Secretary of State, Mo
Mowlam, held briefings at Westminster to which she invited rep-
resentatives of the human rights community to help inform her
policy on Northern Ireland. 1
The results of this meeting were reflected in many of the
Secretary of State's speeches in which she asserted the impor-
tance of rights to the peace process. In her speech to the La-
bour Party annual conference in the autumn of 1997, she said
that the guiding principles for resolving the problems of North-
ern Ireland would be "the same principles that guide the Gov-
ernment overall. They are principles of fairness, justice and
equality of opportunity. ' 32 She talked of the legacy of unfairness
and injustice that haunts both communities in Northern Ireland,
and she placed many of the government's policies in that con-
text, including the incorporation of the European Convention
on Human Rights into British law, legislation to deal with the
marching issue, changes to the emergency legislation, changes
to policing, and measures to combat employment inequality. 3
It is rare, of course, for governments to act from motives
that are completely unadulterated, and support for international
human rights standards may have been only one of several rea-
sons for the change in attitude of the United Kingdom. Britain
had also been subject to quite severe criticism at an international
level in relation to its human rights record in Northern Ireland.
In addition to a large number of adverse judgements from the
European Court of Human Rights, 34 the United Nations Human
Rights Committee and Committee Against Torture had also
31. Shortly before Labour took power, Mo Mowlam held a meeting at Westminster
to which she invited representatives of human rights NGOs working on Northern Ire-
land.
32. Mo Mowlam, Speech to the Labour Party Conference (Nov. 1997).
33. See id.
34. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Murray v.
United Kingdom, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1994); Brogan and Others v. United
Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 16 (1988); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 79 (1978).
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been highly critical of the United Kingdom in 1991 and 1995.
There is evidence that this criticism led to changes in policy 5
and may also have influenced at the time the official opposition
that such criticism should be avoided if possible.
In addition, of course, it is very likely that unionists within
the talks process were left in little doubt that the extensive pro-
tections afforded to rights in the Agreement were there primar-
ily to reassure nationalists who had suffered under both unionist
and direct rule from London that the diluted but extant union
that would emerge from the talks would be a safer place for
them. More progressive elements within unionism saw the valid-
ity of providing extensive safeguards for those whom they were
intent on keeping within the union. There may also have been
the beginning of a realization that ultimately these self-same pro-
tections would be safeguards for unionists within any future Irish
structures that might emerge.
The loyalist parties in the talks process that were close to the
loyalist paramilitary groups3 6 were also responsible for the extent
to which the rights agenda made its way so significantly into the
final text. The support base of both parties is predominately ur-
ban and working class. While traditionally theProtestant work-
ing class would have been supportive of the state and its institu-
tions in Northern Ireland, the experience of those institutions
subjecting members of the Protestant community to similar
treatment as their Catholic counterparts convinced many in the
loyalist community that change was necessary. Already con-
cerned about the socio-economic condition of the Protestant
and working-class, the more that loyalism experienced the sharp
end of paramilitary policing by the RUC, emergency laws, and
special juryless courts, the easier it became for its representatives
to contemplate widespread and fundamental change to the legal
and justice systems.37 The peace process and the consequent ab-
sence of violent attacks on the police also undoubtedly played a
part in a process that liberated loyalist opinion and allowed it to
35. Paul Mageean, Human Rights and the Peace Process, U.S. J. CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY
(1997).
36. The Progressive Unionist Party ("PUP") was generally seen as the political
voice of the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Democratic Party ("UDP") was gen-
erally seen as the Ulster Defense Association.
37. DR. ROBBIE MCVEIGH, "HARASSMENT: IT'S PART OF LIFE HERE... THE SECURITY
FORCES AND HARRASSMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995).
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criticize those institutions that had previously been under attack.
Indeed, some of the proposals from the loyalist parties went be-
yond those which were finally included in the Agreement itself.
The Progressive Unionist Party ("PUP") suggested at one point
that there should be a new constitutional court in Northern Ire-
land that should include judges from Britain, the Republic of
Ireland, and Europe, as well as members of the bench in North-
ern Ireland."
This process was not mirrored in mainstream unionism.
Contemplating serious change to the police, judiciary, and crim-
inal justice system would have constituted firm evidence that
flaws existed within those institutions and that they had in some
ways contributed to the conflict. Such an analysis was a distinct
anathema to unionism, whose mindset, despite the most mo-
mentous changes to the political landscape in Ireland since par-
tition, was clearly still stuck in a conflict mode. To effect real
change to the police was to accept the validity of the "enemy's"
perception of the police, and therefore to betray those who had
stoutly defended the state through a quarter century of the worst
political violence experienced in any Western state since World
War II. In one sense, it could be argued that mainstream union-
ism could only lose in the talks and the question was really how
much would be lost. The potential loss of mainstream unionism
helps to explain the extent to which the predominately middle-
class strain of unionism represented by the Ulster Unionist Party
objected vociferously to changes to the police and criminal jus-
tice systems.
C. The Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition-
The Center Ground?
One of the more interesting political developments in the
peace process was the emergence of the Women's Coalition.
This grouping contested the elections that were held to deter-
mine which parties could attend the negotiations and managed,
through the size of their vote, to become one of the parties at
the talks table. The perspective that they brought to the process
was, of course, one concerned with gender issues, but they also
38. Undated statement from the Progressive Unionist Party entitled Human Rights
and signed by Mr. W. McArthur, Chairperson (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
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managed to engage in some difficult issues for a party that drew
membership and support from both the nationalist and unionist
communities. 9 Their approach to the human rights agenda was
positive. Their commitment to equality may have been a prod-
uct of their origins, but they were also to the fore in the discus-
sion on how best to protect rights constitutionally and also on
the sharper issues of policing and prisoners.4 ° The other party
that has traditionally claimed to occupy the middle ground in
Northern Ireland, while paradoxically supporting the union with
Britain, was the Alliance Party. While the Alliance Party is also
committed to the protection of human rights, issues of funda-
mental change to policing and the release of prisoners appear to
have caused them particular problems. This can be best placed
in the context of a party that has traditionally been among the
staunchest and uncritical supporters of the RUC.
D. Other Players and the Three Governments
The campaign to place the language employed by the
human rights community in the Human Rights Declaration
center stage in the peace process also bore crucial fruit when it
was adopted by individuals and organizations that would have a
crucial role in the process that led to the adoption of the Agree-
ment. In particular, the Mitchell Report on Decommissioning
recognized the importance of confidence building measures
taken by all sides to strengthen the process.41 Decommissioning
was obviously one of those measures but because, as Mitchell rec-
ognized, "success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely
by reference to the decommissioning of arms," other steps were
needed.42 Many of the examples that Mitchell gave of such steps
39. For instance, at the Northern Ireland Forum, which met during the talks pro-
cess, the Women's Coalition voted for the removal of the Union flag that flew over the
Forum building. In contrast, the Alliance Party were absent when the vote was being
taken.
40. See NORTHERN IRELAND WOMEN'S COALITION, SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BODY ON STRAND 2, RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDS (1995).
41. THE INTERNATIONAL BODY, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY (1996). The
Mitchell commission was established to overcome the difficulties that had arisen be-
cause of the decommissioning issue. Mitchell recommended the parallel decommis-
sioning of weaponry at the same time as talks. On the day of the report's publication
the British Government changed its tactic from making decommissioning the pre-con-
dition for talks to advancing the need for electoral support, and announced plans to
hold an election to the talks process.
42. Id.
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related directly to the items on the list of recommendations ad-
vanced by the human rights community.4 3 For instance, Mitchell
expressed the hope that policing in Northern Ireland could be
normalized. 44 He also suggested a review of the use of plastic
bullets and continued progress toward more balanced represen-
tation in the police force, which would contribute to the build-
ing of trust.45 These very matters had been raised with the
Mitchell Commission in a submission from the CAJ and a subse-
quent meeting.4
6
External criticism of the United Kingdom's position in the
peace process also began to be articulated in the language of
rights. An editorial in the influential publication The Nation in
March 1996, written in the aftermath of the breakdown of the
first IRA cease-fire, placed a significant amount of the blame on
John Major, the British Prime Minister at the time.4 7 Interest-
ingly, the writer castigated Major for failing on the rights agenda
by not changing the emergency legal regime and for releasing a
British soldier convicted of the murder of a young Catholic girl
after only three years of a life sentence.48 This critique also
came in the context of increasingly strong language in the
United States State Department Country Reports on the United
Kingdom.4 9
Other influential figures, particularly in the United States,
also began to increase their use of the language of rights, on
occasion, using the same key phrases as the NGO community.
For instance, on St Patrick's Day, the important Friends of Ire-
land (or "Friends") group in Washington issued their annual
statement. In the 1997 statement, the Friends asserted that "ba-
sic issues of equal justice and human rights are at the heart of
the conflict in Northern Ireland and they must be central to any
realistic resolution of the conflict."5' The Agenda for Change
43. Id. at 1-3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 18.
46. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BODY (Dec. 1995).
47. A Major Blow: British Prime Minister John Major and the Peace Process, NATION,
Mar. 4, 1996, at 3.
48. Id.
49. A. Hegarty, United States State Department Report, JUST NEWS, Mar. 1998, vol. 13
no. 3.
50. Annual Statement by the Friends of Ireland, Wash., D.C. (Mar. 17, 1997).
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published two years earlier had said that "human rights have
been at the very heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland. They
must therefore be at the heart of the peace process."
Exactly one year after the Friends of Ireland statement, on
St. Patrick's Day in 1998, the United States Congress passed a
resolution stating its view that any peace agreement reached in
Northern Ireland "must recognize the state's obligation to pro-
tect human rights in all circumstances."5 The resolution fol-
lowed two hearings held by the House Subcommittee on Inter-
national Operations and Human Rights, which were addressed
by members of the human rights community in Northern Ire-
land and internationally. The resolution, which also described
human rights violations and the lack of accountability by those
responsible for such violations as being persistent features of the
conflict in Northern Ireland, was passed unanimously. 2
The input of such initiatives undoubtedly impacted the ne-
gotiations and those engaged in them, and it is also likely that
the two governments and the U.S. administration began to see
the important role that human rights could play in assisting the
negotiation process. For in essence, although there has been a
widely held view that the rights agenda was in effect a nationalist
one, both nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland share
an interest in the protection of human rights. Both believe in
basic rights like freedom of expression and religion, freedom
from discrimination, and other fundamental political liberties.
Most of the political parties were committed to the introduction
of a Bill of Rights.
Negotiations on these matters enjoy distinct advantages.
First, the parameters of the debate can be set by the interna-
tional standards for the protection of human rights that are al-
ready in existence. In this way, the agreed delivery of means to
protect rights is externalized and is therefore partially insulated
from the potentially divisive nature of an internally-focused de-
bate. It is also difficult for the two governments to disagree with
this method or the conclusions that it reaches insofar as they are
consistent with international standards that the governments
have helped to set. Finally, the negotiations can be driven by an
51. 144 CONG. REc. H1196-01 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1998) (expressing sense of con-
gress regarding Northern Ireland).
52. Id.
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agenda agreed on by the parties to address matters on which
there is already an element of consensus.
Additionally, this mode of dealing with human rights issues
will ensure that the vindication of human rights will be seen as
an integral part of the process as opposed to being part of the
political horse-trading accompanying the peace process. This
will avoid situations such as the one that arose when the exclu-
sion orders53 on Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness were
lifted by the British government while many others remained in
place. The lifting of these two orders was seen by unionists as a
concession to republicans rather than as a positive contribution
to the protection of human rights, particularly as there were a
small number of extant orders relating to loyalists, and those re-
lating to the Sinn Fain leaders were lifted purely to facilitate the
peace process. The other major improvement of the human
rights situation, the lifting of the broadcasting ban on parties
associated with paramilitaries, was also seen as a concession to
the republicans. Although lifting this ban benefitted both loyal-
ist and republican spokespersons, it was seen by many as a con-
cession specifically to republicanism. Equally, the release of Pri-
vate Clegg need not have impacted so negatively on the peace
process if it had been presented as part of a package of review of
the sentences of all those imprisoned as a result of the conflict.
Respect for human rights and, consequently for the rule of law,
cannot be successfully built on the notion that human rights are
optional extras or trade-offs between parties. The inverse of the
causal link between the abuse of human rights and conflict will
not be achieved unless the protection of those rights is a matter
of concern to all.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
In addition to the apparent success of the campaign of the
human rights community to place human rights concerns in the
minds of the participants of the talks process, NGOs, and in-
deed, the parties to the talks process often looked to the experi-
53. Exclusion orders are issued under the Prevention of Terrorism Act by the
Home Secretary or the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. Prevention of Terrorism
Act (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, ch. 56 (Eng.). Their purpose is to exclude Irish
or Northern Irish citizens from Britain or from Northern Ireland. The current Labour
Government has discontinued their use.
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ence of other jurisdictions that were emerging from conflict.
The rationale of the human rights agenda was that the resolu-
tion of these issues of concern not only was positive in and of
itself, but also would ease the search for peace. Human rights
groups in Northern Ireland have often argued that the abuse of
human rights is not only wrong, but also feeds and fuels the con-
flict.54 This causal link has been recognized by commentators
and indeed by the institutions and declarations of the interna-
tional community. In the Preamble to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, it is stated that "it is essential, if man is not to
be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be
protected by the rule of law. ''5 5 In addition, the Preamble recog-
nizes that the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is "the foundation of free-
dom, justice and peace in the world. ' 56 Several international
mechanisms for the protection of human rights also, by their
very nature, recognize the link between human rights abuse and
conflict. These mechanisms include the early-warning systems of
the United Nations, specifically, the Human Rights Commission,
and the mandate given to the High Commissioner for National
Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe.
Experience in other jurisdictions has also served to lend em-
pirical support to the claims of NGOs and international mecha-
nisms. It is axiomatic that it was the massive and widespread vio-
lation of human rights that was central to the conflict in
apartheid South Africa.
The homelands policy of geographic separation based on
race, the forced mass relocation of Black South Africans, the
denial of the franchise, political suppression of individuals
and political parties, human rights abuses in response to pop-
ular protest, the imposition of the Afrikaans language in
black schools; all these led to revolt and conditions approach-
ing civil war in South Africa.
It is equally clear that the relative success of the transition from
54. See supra notes 4-11.
55. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pmbl., at 135-36, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
56. Id.
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apartheid to a multi-racial democracy has been based, to a large
extent, on the centrality of human rights and mechanisms for
their protection to the process. The 1994 South African Consti-
tution articulates the fundamental freedoms that are to be pro-
tected, but goes further than this in trying to inculcate a human
rights culture. It directs all South African courts to "promote the
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on
freedom and equality."57 Additionally, the constitution estab-
lishes a number of bodies entrusted with the protection of
human rights. These bodies include the Constitutional Court,
the Judicial Services Commission, the Public Protector, the
Human Rights Commission, the Commission on Gender Equal-
ity, and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights.58 While
it may be argued that the mechanisms provided for by the consti-
tution are in many respects the culmination of the negotiations
process, the need to protect human rights was recognized
throughout by the participants to the process and its
frameworks. As early as three months after the opening of talks
between the African National Congress. and the South African
government, a working group was set up in May 1990 to examine
issues including the release of political prisoners, security legisla-
tion, and steps towards lifting the state of emergency. The fears
of the white community were also addressed in an address by
President de Klerk at the opening of parliament in 1992 when
he outlined protection of language and cultural rights, educa-
tion rights, and devolution of power to regional levels.
A cursory examination of peace processes elsewhere ap-
pears to lend weight to a correlation between relative success of
the negotiating process and the centrality of rights to it. For in-
stance, in the Dayton Agreement, all of the parties recognized
that the "observance of human rights and the protection of refu-
gees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a
lasting peace."59 To that end, they agreed on detailed measures
for the protection of rights including, inter alia, a Commission
on Human Rights and a Commission on Refugees and Displaced
57. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, Act No. 108 of 1996,
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD at binder XVII (Albert P.
Blaunstein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1997).
58. Id.
59. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with An-
nexes, Dec. 14, 1996, art. VII, 35 I.L.M. 75, 90.
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Persons.6 °
In Guatemala, at the beginning of the peace process in
April 1991, the government, the army, and the main guerrilla
groups met to set the agenda for negotiations. The agenda was
to include "human rights, the identity and rights of indigenous
peoples, socio-economic issues, a truth commission, and the role
of the army during peace time."61
Unlike in Bosnia, Guatemala, and South Africa, the peace
process in the Middle East placed little emphasis, at least in
agreed texts, on the importance of human rights. In a critique
of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Ar-
rangements for Palestinians ("DP"), published in 1993, the Pal-
estinian human rights group A1-Haq predicts with considerable
foresight the problems that were to arise in the area because of
the failure to accord appropriate weight to human rights protec-
tions.62 A1-Haq comments that
the absence of any human rights provision .and the failure to
agree expressly to the amendment of Israeli military legisla-
tion and practice raise serious questions as to the standard of
protection of human rights, and the real potential for their
improvement, during the interim phase; and, finally, the pro-
posed jurisdiction of Israeli and Palestinian authorities re-
mains obscure, creating potential problems of accountability
in the protection of Palestinian human rights.63
There is no express provision for the protection of human
rights in the DP. While concentrating primarily on continuing
human rights violations by the Israelis, Al-Haq also called on the
new Palestinian authorities to uphold human rights standards
and to incorporate these standards into domestic law so that
"these instruments will set the standards that govern the action
of the future Council. 64
In addition, Al-Haq expressed concern at the DP's refer-
ence to a "strong" Palestinian police force. While the DP dis-
cussed such a force ensuring public order and guaranteeing in-
60. Id. art. VI, at 90.
61. RICHARD WILSON, THE PEOPLE'S CONSCIENCE? CIVIL GROUPS, PEACE AND JUSTICE
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND GUATEMALAN TRANSITIONS (1997).
62. AL-HAQo A HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON
INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PALESTINIANS (1993).
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 10.
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ternal security, there was no mention of the necessity of holding
the police accountable or the importance of human rights to
their work.6 5 Since the establishment of the new Palestinian po-
lice force, there have been particularly disappointing and credi-
ble claims of serious human rights abuses even by those at the
heart of the Palestinian leadership.66
The DP, of course, was agreed upon as a result of intensive
and secret negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian delega-
tions in Oslo. While the Norweigian government lent adminis-
trative support to the process, there was no further overt exter-
nal input. The peace processes in Bosnia and Guatemala, apart
from the centrality that they accorded rights issues, also both
benefited from significant international input; the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe led in the case of Bos-
nia, and the United Nations led in Guatemala. There was also
an institutional international input into the talks process in
Northern Ireland in the role of Senator Mitchell and the co-
chairs of the talks process, Mr. Harry Holkeri from Finland and
General John de Chastelain from Canada. In addition, we have
already seen that influential commentators, external to the for-
mal process, but crucial to its success, had begun to see the im-
portance of human rights.
It is difficult to determine to what extent talks participants
in Northern Ireland learned from the successes and failures of
similar processes in other jurisdictions. There is little doubt that
the conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Middle
East were often compared6" and as the peace processes began,
common features were identified. Given the human rights lan-
guage and commitments that ultimately ended up in the Agree-
ment, it seems likely that the general international trend towards
linking the protection to peace was followed, whether or not by
all of the talks participants and whether consciously or not, in
Northern Ireland.
65. Id. at 12.
66. JOINT MISSION TO ISRAEL, THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND NEW PALESTINIAN Au-
TONOMOUS AREAS ON BEHALF OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES AND THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CRITICISMS VOICED BY
HANAN ASHRAWI IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION, THE CASE OF THE OCCU-
PIED TERRITORIES, JERICHO AND THE GAZA STRIP (1994).
67. For example, Brian Gormally and Kieran McEvoy in The Release and Reintegra-
tion of Politically Motivated Prisoners compared the mechanisms for release of prisoners in
various conflicts around the world including South Africa and Palestine.
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IV. THE NORTHERN IRELAND A GREEMENT
There are few segments of the Agreement that do not-ex-
plicitly and implicitly-refer to the centrality of human rights
concerns. The British and Irish Governments, together with all
the parties engaged in the talks process, clearly accepted this as a
starting premise. The preambular paragraphs set a clear tone
with all the parties to the Agreement firmly dedicating them-
selves to "the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance and mu-
tual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human
rights of all," as the most fitting memorial to those who lost their
lives during the conflict.
More significantly, the commitment in the preamble is
given frequent and concrete expression at various stages
throughout the Agreement. The commitment is therefore more
than rhetorical, and it amounts to a recognition that true respect
for human rights must underpin any hope that the Agreement
can provide "a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning."68
The extent to which this commitment is given concrete expres-
sion can be determined by an analysis of the Agreement itself
and an examination of what has happened since.
A. Constitutional Issues
In this segment of the Agreement, the parties affirm that
whatever constitutional choice is exercised, power shall be exer-
cised
with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all of the people in the
diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be
founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of,
civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from dis-
crimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and ofjust
and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of
both communities.6 9
A surprising omission from this listing of rights is that of eco-
nomic rights, though this right is included in listings elsewhere
in the document. One must assume, therefore, that this omis-
68. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Declaration of Support 1 1. The text of
the Good Friday Agreement is paginated differently in different printed versions. To
avoid confusion, all references in the text are made to the chapter title and paragraph
numbers rather than page numbers.
69. Id., Constitutional Issues 1 (v).
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sion was not deliberate. Nevertheless, it is vital that people con-
cerned about human rights continue to emphasize the inter-de-
pendence between rights and reject the notion that somehow
economic rights are less important than other rights. This is a
point that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mary Robinson, made about the Agreement in a recent
speech in Belfast when she said:
It also, very importantly, recognises that civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights are all interdependent and
that, in combination they underpin any democratic society.
The inter-dependence which figures in the Agreement re-
flects the growing consensus at the international level about
the importance of addressing rights in a more holistic way.
In my travels around the world, it is clear that the legacy
of the Cold War which suggested there was some contradic-
tion between civil and political rights on the one hand, and
economic, social and cultural on the other, is slowly dissipat-
ing. How can one argue that the right to vote is more impor-
tant than the right to a roof over one's head? And yet, with-
out the right to vote-and all that entails in terms of demo-
cratic choice-how will people ever secure the policies which
will provide roofs over their heads?
No, it is not one set of rights or the other-it is the pur-
suit of a broad and inclusive human rights agenda which will
create the future we all aspire to for ourselves and our chil-
dren. The Good Friday Agreement recognises that in a fun-
damental and exciting way.7 °
B. Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland
The Agreement "provides for a democratically elected As-
sembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership,
capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and
subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all
sides of the community. '"71 Among the safeguards listed, explicit
reference is made to the incorporation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights ("ECHR"), a Bill of Rights for Northern
70. Mary Robinson, Speech on Equality and Human Rights - Their Role in Peace
Building, Belfast (Dec. 2, 1998).
71. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland 1.
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Ireland, a Human Rights Commission,7 2 arrangements to ensure
that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they
infringe neither the ECHR nor any Bill of Rights,7" and a possi-
ble Equality Commission."
We comment elsewhere on the proposals relating to a
Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission, and the
question of a Bill of Rights, but it is important here to address
the commitment by the U.K. Government to incorporate the
ECHR into its domestic law.75 Since the signing of the Agree-
ment, the Human Rights Act has completed its passage through
the U.K. parliament and is due to come into effect in April 2000.
This effectively incorporates the ECHR into domestic law and
means that litigants will be able to rely on the protections of the
ECHR in local courts. Unfortunately, the U.K. Government did
not take the opportunity presented by incorporation to withdraw
its derogation from the ECHR regarding seven-day detention
powers under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which were
found to breach the fair trial provisions of the ECHR in the Bro-
gan case. 76 Nevertheless, incorporation of the ECHR will pro-
vide an important safeguard.
In its clauses on the operation of the Assembly, the Agree-
ment envisages that a special committee may be appointed to
"examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legis-
lation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the
ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the powers to
call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the mat-
ter."77 It is not clear what relationship, if any, such a committee
would have with the Human Rights Commission, nor what signif-
icance, if any, should be placed in the fact that such a committee
is optional. However, reassurance as to the central importance
of rights can be found later in the same chapter, when the
Agreement lists some of the limitations on the authority of the




75. See id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, United
Kingdom Legislation 2.
76. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16
(1988)..
77. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Operation of
the Assembly 11.
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Assembly. Thus, the Assembly only has authority to pass primary
legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to
"(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland sup-
plementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would
render the relevant legislation null and void."7
Nor are the safeguards limited to the workings of the Assem-
bly. With reference to non-devolved matters, the Secretary of
State and the Westminster Parliament must "legislate as neces-
sary to ensure the United Kingdom's international obligations
are met in respect of Northern Ireland."79 This point is particu-
larly important in that it underlines the importance of the
United Kingdom's international obligations. Where, for exam-
ple, the Agreement is silent or indeed, where its commitments
are less than those applicable under international human rights
law, the government must legislate to ensure compliance with
the international obligations.
Furthermore, and very importantly, "[a] s a condition of ap-
pointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex
A) undertaking to discharge effectively in good faith all the re-
sponsibilities attaching to their office."8" Both the Pledge of Of-
fice and the Code of Conduct for Ministers incorporate refer-
ences to human rights. Thus, all Ministers will be expected to
take a pledge, which among other things promises that they will
"serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and.., act in
accordance with the general obligation on government to pro-
mote equality and prevent discrimination."'" The Code of Con-
duct requires that Ministers "must at all times" work in a way that
respects a series of key principles: impartiality, objectivity, ac-
countability, openness, responsibility, equality of treatment, per-
sonal honesty, and integrity. 82
These parts of the Agreement are very important, not only
for the standards that they set for those in elected public posi-
78. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Legislation
26(a).
79. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Relations with
other institutions 1 33(b).
80. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive Au-
thority 23.
81. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Annex A (c).
82. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Code of Con-
duct.
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tions, but also in the standards that they set for public life gener-
ally. Ministers, if they are to uphold their pledge of office, will
have to ensure that the departments for which they are responsi-
ble meet these standards of service. The objectives of serving all
the people of Northern Ireland equally, and doing so in an open
and transparent manner that makes public bodies fully account-
able for their actions, are clearly laid out in the text. It is of
course the duty of everyone-elected officials, public servants,
and ordinary citizens-to ensure that these objectives are met in
practice, but the Agreement at least sets important benchmarks.
C. Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
Very significantly, a whole chapter is devoted specifically to
the issue of human rights. Additionally, the coupling of human
rights with a concern for "safeguards" makes it clear how a com-
mitment to human rights has to underpin any long-term resolu-
tion of the conflict. While human rights protections are vital in
their own right, as a matter of principle, it is also recognized that
they are necessary to create the framework within which political
accommodation can be reached and peace ensured. Thus, re-
gardless of whatever structures emerge, each community and the
individuals within each community should be assured that their
human rights will be respected.
All of the parties to the Agreement affirm "their commit-
ment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious lib-
erties of everyone in the community.""3 It is not clear to those
who were not engaged in the details of the negotiations why an
enumeration of certain rights was made, and not others. The
particular rights enumerated are the right of free political
thought, the right to freedom and expression of religion, the
right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations,
the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legiti-
mate means, the right to choose one's place of residence freely,
the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity,
regardless of class, creed, disability, gender, or ethnicity, the
right to freedom from sectarian harassment, and the right of wo-
men to full and equal political participation.
83. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights 1.
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1. Equality of Opportunity
The Agreement's provisions on equality of opportunity are
perhaps among the most innovative of the broad range of
human rights provisions contained within the document. This
issue is dealt with in greater detail in the article by Dr. Christo-
pher McCrudden, who, together with the public service union
UNISON, played the key role in shaping the Agreement's equal-
ity provisions and their subsequent enactment in the Northern
Ireland Act of 1998. Here, we briefly highlight some of the key
features of the Agreement and subsequent developments.
The Agreement provided for a new statutory obligation and
statutory schemes to promote equality of opportunity. It sug-
gested that these schemes would cover arrangements for policy
appraisals, public access to information, consultation, impact as-
sessments, monitoring, and timetables. The Agreement also re-
ferred to a recent government proposal to amalgamate the ex-
isting equality agencies in Northern Ireland8 4 into one new
body. Importantly, however, it stressed that this proposal should
be subject to the outcome of the public consultation that was
currently underway. A reference was also made to the possible
establishment of a Department of Equality within government.
An analysis of the first available draft of the Agreement
shows that a number of important changes were made in this
section of the Agreement in subsequent negotiations. The first
of these is that the proposals in respect to equality were all made
subject to the outcome of public consultation. This change was
pressed by some of the parties to take account of the fact that
there was currently a public consultation exercise underway on
some of these issues, and it would clearly have been unaccept-
able to render this nugatory by resolving the matter definitively
in the Agreement. Furthermore, a requirement was added to
provide for an assessment of the impact of decisions on equality
of opportunity for different groups, in addition to a requirement
for public access to information about decisions.
84. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, New Insti-
tutions in Northern Ireland 6. These are the Fair Employment Commission, the
Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, and the North-
ern Ireland Disability Council. Id.
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The first unpublished draft of the Northern Ireland Bill,85
the piece of legislation brought forward to implement much of
the Agreement, shows, however, that the inclusion of these pro-
visions in the Agreement did not mean that they would necessar-
ily be implemented. In relation to the question of amalgamating
the existing equality bodies, the government brought forward
proposals to establish one new Equality Commission. This amal-
gamation was entirely contrary to the outcome of the public con-
sultation exercise 6 and effectively nullified this aspect of the
Agreement.
Similarly, the draft legislation imposed no clear obligation
on public authorities to establish schemes to promote equality of
opportunity, and there was no reference at all to the question of
impact assessments. The provisions on access to information
and consultation were also extremely limited and did not reflect
the requirements of the Agreement.87 It was not until the end of
the parliamentary process that most of these deficiencies were
remedied. Remedying these deficiencies required intensive lob-
bying and the support of a broad coalition of politicians from
across the political divide in Northern Ireland and in Britain. 8
2. National Security Exemptions
The British Government also undertook to make "rapid
progress with ... a review of the national security aspects of the
present fair employment legislation at the earliest possible
time."" Given this commitment, it was a source of considerable
disappointment to discover provisions in the draft Northern Ire-
85. Northern Ireland Bill, Bill 229, July 15, 1998 [hereinafter Northern Ireland
Bill].
86. See COMMITrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS BY
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF RESPONSES TO THE WHITE PAPER
"PARTNERSHIP FOR EQUALITY" (1998) (on file with the Committee on the Administration
of Justice).
87. The Northern Ireland Bill provided only that groups should be consulted
about the shape of equality schemes and that they should be given access to informa-
tion on the schemes. This was eventually changed to ensure that the groups likely to be
affected by decisions would be consulted about those decisions and that they would
have access to information relevant to the decisions.
88. See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, pt. VII (Eng.) (reflecting debates in
Commons and Lords on Northern Ireland Bill).
89. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Op-
portunity, Economic, Social and Cultural Issues 2.
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land Bill9" that replicated the existing provisions under fair em-
ployment legislation.9 Under existing fair employment legisla-
tion and under the draft Bill, a certificate signed by the Secretary
of State stating that a particular action or decision was taken in
order to safeguard national security would be sufficient to pre-
vent any challenge to the decision or action on the grounds that
it was discriminatory. 92
The provisions under the fair employment legislation had
been particularly controversial in that they effectively denied any
remedy in the local courts. This controversy had led to the pro-
vision in the Agreement to carry out a review of the provisions.
However, instead of fulfilling this aspect of the Agreement, it was
deemed necessary to further extend these provisions to provide
national security exemptions under the Northern Ireland Bill as
well. The section 42 provisions of the Fair Employment Act 1976
had been the subject of a challenge in the European Court of
Human Rights. Ironically, four days after the date of the draft
Northern Ireland Bill, the European Court found that the provi-
sions violated the ECHR.93
The clear expectation was that the provisions in the draft
Bill would be removed, but when the Bill was published on July
15, 1998, the offending sections remained.94 It was not until the
Committee stage in the House of Lords that the Government's
intention became clear. It decided not to remove the provisions
but to establish a tribunal to deal with any complaints about the
application of certificates. However, those complaining to the
tribunal would have no right to know the case against them.
The special tribunal established to hear the case may sit in secret
and exclude the victim, and the victim will have no right to have
his or her own lawyer represent them. Instead, the government
may itself appoint a lawyer for complainants, and this lawyer will
have no responsibilities to the complainants.
These proposals provoked strong criticism in the Lords and
90. See Northern Ireland Bill, 1998, § 75(4), (5).
91. See Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, 1976, ch. 25, § 42 (Eng.).
92. See id.; see also Northern Ireland Bill, 1998, § 75(4), (5).
93. Tinnelly v. United Kingdom, Application No. 20390/92,July 10, 1998 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. decision not yet published in Series A) (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://www.
dhcour.coe.fr/eng/Judgments.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal).
94. See Northern Ireland Bill, 1998, ch. 47, § 79(4), (5) (Eng.).
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in the Commons, and the Northern Ireland Bar Council wrote
to the government pointing out that the provisions were con-
trary to their code of practice and that it would therefore be
difficult for them to fulfill the role stipulated for them under the
legislation. These criticisms caused some problems with corre-
spondence being exchanged between the Bar Council and the
Attorney General and led to the establishment of a working
group to address the issues raised. Nevertheless, the legislation
was passed, and it remains to be seen how the situation will
evolve.
3. The Human Rights Commission
The Good Friday Agreement provided for
[a] new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with
membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the commu-
nity balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, in-
dependent of Government, with an extended and enhanced
role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory
Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under re-
view the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices,
making recommendations to Government as necessary; pro-
viding information and promoting awareness of human
rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the
new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court pro-
ceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so. 5
The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission ...
will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defin-
ing, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those
in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the
particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as ap-
propriate on international instruments and experience.
These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual re-
spect for the identity and ethos of both communities and par-
ity of esteem, and - taken together with the ECHR - to
constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the
issues for consideration by the Commission will be:
* the formulation of a general obligation on government and
public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of
95. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Op-
portunity, Human Rights, New Institutions in Northern Ireland 5.
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treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in
Northern Ireland; and
e a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated
against and to equality of opportunity in both the public
and private sectors."
It is envisaged that there would be ajoint committee of repre-
sentatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and
South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in
the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider,
among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter,
open to signature by all the democratic political parties, re-
flecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of
the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ire-
land.97
When this final text is compared with the first available draft of
the Agreement, we can see that two important additions were
made in the process of the negotiations. The additions to the
Agreement included the requirement on the Human Rights
Commission (or "Commission") to consult on the content of the
Bill of Rights and to have a membership that reflects the com-
munity balance in Northern Ireland. An analysis of the parlia-
mentary process, however, shows that there was opposition to
some of the powers and roles envisaged for the Commission on
the part of those given the task of drafting the legislation and
taking it through the parliamentary process.
Perhaps the most glaring omissions concern the require-
ment to consult and advise on the contents of the Bill of Rights
and the absence of any requirement to establish the joint com-
mittee for cooperation between the two human rights commis-
sions in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The
draft Northern Ireland Bill merely provided for the appointment
of members to any such joint committee that might be estab-
lished. The ability of the Commission to provide assistance to
litigants was initially limited to litigation under the Human
Rights Act and did not include the power to support litigation
under the non-discrimination provisions of the Northern Ire-
land Bill itself. There was also no provision enabling the Com-
mission to bring court proceedings in its own name as provided
96. Id., Human Rights, United Kingdom Legislation 4.
97. Id., Human Rights, Ajoint Committee 10.
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for in the Agreement.98
Following representations from NGOs and signatories to
the Agreement, some of these matters were remedied by the
time the Bill was formally published. However, it was not until
the final stages of the Bill's passage through parliament that a
number of these deficiencies were resolved. The published Bill
provided a statutory basis for the consultation exercise on the
Bill of Rights and, while not establishing the joint committee,
strengthened the provisions to require the Commission to "do
all that they can to facilitate the establishment of the committee
referred to in paragraph 10 of that section of the Agreement."
However, it was not until the Committee stage in the House
of Lords that the restrictions on assistance to litigants were re-
moved and the Commission was given a broader power to assist
in proceedings relating to the protection of human rights.99 It
was even later in the process that the Government finally moved
on the ability of the Commission to bring proceedings in its own
name. The Commission's powers in this respect are, however,
quite limited and mean that the Commission will be able to
bring proceedings on human rights questions but not if they are
relying on the protection given by the incorporated ECHR. If
the Commission wishes to pursue ECHR-related points, then it
will have to find an individual victim to bring the case.' 00
The other major point of contention in relation to the
Human Rights Commission concerns the power to investigate vi-
olations of human rights. This matter was not specifically pro-
vided for in the Agreement, but the list of issues that were re-
ferred to was clearly not envisaged as an exhaustive one, as can
be seen from the wording "to include" 1 1 in the Agreement.
NGOs maintained that in light of both the Agreement's frequent
references to international standards and the commitment that
the Commission would have a greater role than the present role
of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission should follow the minimum standards laid down in
the Paris Principles for National Human Rights Institutions. In
addition, given the importance vested in a Human Rights Com-
98. See id., Human Rights, New Institutions in Northern Ireland 5.
99. See Northern Ireland Bill (as amended in Committee), H.L. Bill 158, cl. 66.
100. See House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 319, Nov. 10, 1998, col. 706.
101. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Op-
portunity, Human Rights, New Institutions in Northern Ireland 5.
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mission for underpinning an effective peace process, it seemed
natural to assume that international good practice would be fol-
lowed. This assumption represents a view that was shared by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who be-
came involved in the debate in both Northern Ireland and the
Republic.10 2 These standards envisage human rights commis-
sions being in a position to carry out investigations and having
the necessary powers to do so. In particular, the standards sug-
gest that commissions should have the power to discover docu-
ments and subpoena witnesses. Finally, after a great deal of pres-
sure, the Government included a power to investigate, but did
not provide the Commission with the necessary powers to make
these investigations effective. Thus, the Commission has a statu-
tory basis to carry out investigations that is not backed up by any
powers to secure information from reluctant sources. This deci-
sion was unfortunate because it means that the Commission does
not comply with the minimum international standards laid down
in the Paris Principles for National Human Rights Institutions.
In a further effort to counter criticism on this front, the Govern-
ment stated that, subject to the requirements of national secur-
ity, it would cooperate with investigations. It also offered a re-
view of the Commission's powers to be completed within a two
year period.
4. The Irish Republic
The Irish Government also committed itself to "ensure at
least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will
pertain in Northern Ireland.' 0 3 This commitment has the po-
tential to improve the human rights situation in the Irish Repub-
lic as well. In concrete terms the Irish Government agreed to
establish a Human Rights Commission in the Republic with a
remit and mandate equivalent to that in Northern Ireland. It
also agreed to implement enhanced equality legislation and
equal status legislation to ratify the Council of Europe Frame-
work Convention on National Minorities, which the U.K. Gov-
ernment has already ratified. The Irish Government also agreed
102. See Letter from Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
to Prime Minister Tony Blair and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (June 18, 1998) (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
103. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Op-
portunity, Human Rights, Comparable Steps by the Irish Government 9.
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to take further steps to demonstrate its respect for the different
traditions on the island of Ireland.
Interestingly, the Irish Government did not go so far as to
commit itself to incorporating the ECHR into its domestic law.
Rather, it agreed to consider this issue further. With the deci-
sion to incorporate having been taken by the United Kingdom,
Ireland remains the only member of the Council of Europe not
to have taken this step.
5. Victims
The Agreement indicated that the participants believed that
it was essential that the suffering of the victims of violence be
acknowledged as a necessary element of reconciliation. In this
context they looked forward to the work of the Northern Ireland
Victims Commission.1" 4 The Victims Commissioner produced a
report entitled "We Will Remember Them." Although in that
report the Commissioner makes clear that his definition of a vic-
tim is broad and includes those killed by paramilitaries as well as
by the state, he very unfortunately reinforces an already existing
hierarchy of victimhood in his report. He devoted a great deal
of time and attention to the needs of police officers injured in
the conflict and the relatives of those officers who were killed,
and also to the relatives of those who disappeared due to the acts
of paramilitary groups. However, he was not as sympathetic to
the concerns of the relatives of those killed by the state. Here,
he simply recorded the concerns and noted that he had agreed
to report on them.
His differential approach, and the subsequent appointment
of the Minister for Security as the official advocate within gov-
ernment on behalf of victims, had done little to address the con-
cerns of the relatives of those killed by the security forces. Those
killed by security forces account for eleven percent of all of the
deaths. This figure does not of course include those killed as a
result of collusion between security forces and paramilitary
groups. This approach has done little to promote reconciliation
and healing. Indeed, in some ways it has made matters worse
because the victims of the state feel that the mechanism set up
104. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Op-
portunity, Human Rights, Reconciliation and Victims of Violence 11.
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by the state, which was meant to address their pain, has served to
deny and diminish the fact that they too are victims.
6. Economic, Social, and Cultural Issues
There is a specific section of the Agreement referring to the
importance of economic, social, and cultural issues in bringing
about greater rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity for
everyone. Specific reference is made to the importance of eco-
nomic growth, social inclusion, and the advancement of women
in public life.1"5 It is very welcome that the Agreement refers
explicitly to the Targeting Social Need initiative and the need
progressively to eliminate the differential in employment rates
between the two communities. 10 6
Importantly, the Agreement notes that "[a]ll participants
recognise the importance of respect, understanding and toler-
ance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ire-
land, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the
various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural
wealth of the island of Ireland."'1 7 While the British Govern-
ment did not commit itself outright to sign the Council of Eu-
rope's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, it did com-
mit to "active consideration ' ' of this issue. This assertion is fol-
lowed by a series of specific proposals in relation to the
promotion and protection of the Irish language.
Subsequent media disclosures09 caused grave disquiet with
respect to the British Government's intentions with regard to its
commitments about the Irish language. In a Northern Ireland
Office ("NIO") leaked document, a senior official briefing his
Minister wrote of these commitments: "What these worthy senti-
ments might mean in practice is a matter of interpretation, and
we could argue that our interpretation is as valid as anyone
else's." The tenor of the rest of the memorandum suggests that
a minimalist interpretation is to be assumed if not encouraged.
The outcry following these revelations seems, however, to
have borne some fruit. Since the signing of the Good Friday




109. See Exposed: NIO Deal Deceit, ANDERSONSTOWN NEWS, May 2, 1998, at 1.
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Agreement, the United Kingdom decided to sign the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 110 Additionally,
the Education (Northern Ireland) Order (or "Order") was
passed onJuly 10, 1998.111 Article 89 of the Order places a statu-
tory duty on the Department of Education in Northern Ireland
to encourage and facilitate the development of Irish-medium ed-
ucation.112 The lack of state funding for such schools, in com-
parison to state support for integrated education (schools where
Catholic and Protestant children are educated together), had
long been a matter of contention. The new Order places Irish
language education on the same statutory footing as integrated
education. 13
D. Security
While the Agreement refers to the "normalisation of secur-
ity arrangements and practices," '14 it is disappointing that it goes
no further than to restate the position ex post ante. It is clear that
there is no emergency threatening the life of the nation, and
therefore there is no justification in international law for emer-
gency legislation.11 All emergency law should therefore be dis-
mantled.
It is interesting to note that the question of repeal of emer-
gency legislation is left entirely in the hands of the U.K. Govern-
ment and, indeed, the terms of reference' 16 for the criminal jus-
tice review established under the Agreement, discussed below,
specifically exclude consideration of emergency legislation from
its remit."' This exclusion is particularly worrisome as the con-
tinued use and abuse of emergency legislation would tend to un-
dermine improvements to policing brought about by the com-
mission on policing set up by the Agreement.
In this context, the recent paper published by the U.K. Gov-
ernment on its plans for emergency legislation is particularly dis-
110. IRISH NEWS, June 10, 1998.
111. Education (Northern Ireland) Order, 1998 (Eng.).
112. Id. art. 89.
113. Id.
114. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Security 1.
115. See COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, No EMERGENCY, No EMER-
GENCY LAw (1995).
116. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice I 4-6.
117. See id., Policing and Justice, Annex B.
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appointing. 18 Instead of moving away from emergency laws, the
Government is proposing to entrench them in a permanent
piece of U.K. wide anti-terrorism legislation. In addition, it sug-
gests that even with this legislation, there may be a need to re-
tain a number of Northern Irish specific provisions.
If the Government continues on this course of action, it is
likely to encounter further criticism at the international human
rights level.' 19 It is profoundly regrettable that the opportunity
to break with the past has not been taken in relation to emer-
gency legislation. The failure to do so is likely to impede seri-
ously any efforts to secure support for new arrangements in re-
spect to policing and the criminal justice system.
E. Policing and Justice
The Agreement's provisions on policing are of great signifi-
cance. The Agreement refers to a "a new beginning to policing
in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting
and sustaining support from the community as a whole." 20 The
Agreement goes on to point out that
[t]he participants believe it is essential that policing struc-
tures and arrangements are such that the police service is
professional, effective and efficient, fair and ,impartial, free
from partisan political control, accountable; both under the
laws and to the community it serves; representative of the so-
ciety it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-opera-
tive criminal justice system which conforms with human
rights norms. 1
2 1
These parameters are very similar to those proposed in a major
piece of comparative international research published on polic-
ing by the Committee on the Administration of Justice some
months before the signing of the Agreement. 122
In order to achieve this goal, the Agreement requires the
creation of an independent commission, which should be
broadly representative with expert and international representa-
118. LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 1998, Cm. 4178.
119. See The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Tor-
ture, on its examination of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and Dependent Territories, Nov. 19, 1998 (CAT/C/SR.354, 355, and 360).
120. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice 1.
121. Id. 1 2.
122. See MARY O'RAWE & DR. LINDA MOORE, HUMAN RIGHTS ON Du'rv (1997).
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tion among its membership. It also stresses that the Policing
Commission should consult widely (including with expert
NGOs) and report no later than the summer of 1999. The terms
of reference outline the need for widespread community sup-
port, a legislative and constitutional framework requiring impar-
tial policing, a clear framework of legal and democratic account-
ability, and an effective complaints system. 123
The Policing Commission was appointed in June 1998 by
the Northern Irish Secretary of State, Dr. Mo Mowlam, with
Chris Patten, the former Governor of Hong Kong, as chairper-
son. There was considerable controversy surrounding the ap-
pointments and in particular the lack of consultation with key
groups. A particular gap in the make-up of the commission lay
in the absence of any member with specific expertise in the area
of human rights.
The Irish Government in particular was extremely unhappy
at the lack of consultation. It emerged that only one of ten nom-
inees put forward by the Irish was appointed and that this ap-
pointment was only made after substantial effort on their part.124
The picture that emerges is one of civil servants within the
Northern Ireland Office pressing ahead with selecting and ap-
proaching members without involving the Irish Government at
all in the process.
Problems also emerged in the early days of the Policing
Commission's work when it was felt that there was a heavy em-
phasis on contacts with police officers and policing bodies but
no sign of public contact with policing critics. This initial criti-
cism was further heightened when it became known that there
was a serving police officer working on a full-time basis with the
commission at its headquarters. 12' Given the extreme sensitivity
of the policing debate and the suspicions that were rife, the Po-
licing Commission felt obliged to try to reassure the public.
They insisted that this officer's role was solely to be a liason be-
tween the commission and the police.
Despite these teething problems, people have continued to
vest a lot of hope in the work of the Policing Commission and its
123. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice 3, Annex A,
Terms of Reference.
124. See Policing Commission, IRISH TIMES, June 4, 1998, at 17.
125. See SUNDAY BUSINESS POST, Oct. 4, 1998.
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ability to deliver the necessary level of change. Literally
thousands of people have attended a series of public meetings
throughout Northern Ireland. These meetings have sometimes
been quite acrimonious but have provided an important space
for public debate on this deeply contentious issue.
The key challenge for the Policing Commission does not lie
in identifying practical proposals to remedy policing problems in
Northern Ireland. There are many good and concrete proposals
that have been made and these often draw on good practice else-
where. Rather, the challenge lies in securing the necessary de-
gree of public and political consensus behind a particular pack-
age of measures to deliver change.
Alongside the commission into policing, this chapter of the
Agreement promises a "parallel wide-ranging review of criminal
justice." '126 In comparison to the detail on policing, the terms of
reference and status of this review are much more vague, and
the review is to "be carried out by the British Government
through a mechanism with an independent element."127
Under the terms of the Agreement, the review is to report
by autumn 1999, and, this will allow it to consider any matters
referred to itby the Policing Commission. While this review was
a good idea in principle, it makes it all the more unacceptable
that the criminal justice review should be carried out by a mech-
anism largely internal to the civil service. Important issues relat-
ing to the powers of the police, and police relations to the crimi-
nal justice system, may be identified by the Policing Commission
only to be referred to what effectively amounts to an internal
Northern Ireland Office body with the resultant limitations.
The review was formally launched on June 27, 1998, and the
Secretary of State indicated that "it would be taken forward by a
team of officials from the Northern Ireland Office and will in-
clude representatives of the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney
General." 128 The team was to be assisted by five independent
assessors including representatives from the legal profession,
academia, the voluntary sector, and a retired English judge.
126. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 2, Policing and Justice 5.
127. Id.
128. See Northern Ireland Office, Secretary of State Launches Review of Criminal Justice,
June 27, 1998 (visited Apr. 15, 1999) <http://www.nio.gov.uk/980627a-nio.htm> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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On August 27, 1998, the review group published a consulta-
tion paper 129 and invited submissions by October 30, 1998.130
The consultation paper is general in nature and raises questions
on topics such as the prosecution process, law reform, and judi-
cial appointments. It is anticipated that the group will publish a
more detailed document in due course.
F. Strand Three: British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
Aside from the specific references and mechanisms referred
to above, this section makes it clear that the Irish Government
will continue to have the opportunity to raise issues of concern
on human rights matters with the British Government through
the new British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which has
yet to be established. The British-Irish Intergovernmental Con-
ference will be the successor to the Anglo-Irish Conference that
was established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. In
particular, the Agreement states that "l[t] he Conference will also
address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and po-
licing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is de-
volved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify
co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or
cross-border aspects of those matters."3 1 The importance of this
provision will depend to some extent on the effectiveness of the
other mechanisms established under the Agreement. Issues
such as prisoners and policing remain matters outside the re-
sponsibility of the new Assembly; however, it will continue to
provide an important avenue for inter-governmental contact on
these issues.
CONCLUSION
This detailed examination of the Agreement illustrates
clearly the extent to which human rights language and principle
color all aspects of the text. The emphasis on human rights is
undoubtedly a singular victory for the human rights community
and indeed for all interested in justice and equality in Northern
129. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
NORTHERN IRELAND: A CONSULTATION PAPER (1998).
130. See generally COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, SUBMISSION TO
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REVIEW No. 78 (1998).
131. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra note 17.
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Ireland. Equally, the Agreement was a major defeat for those in
Northern Ireland and Britain who are opposed to the rights
agenda. The legislative process of the Northern Ireland Bill
clearly showed that there was considerable opposition from ele-
ments of the state to the changes envisaged in the Agreement.
Our above analysis has shown that there was a concerted attempt
on the human rights commission, on equality of opportunity,
and on policing to dilute the effectiveness of what was promised
in the Agreement. There has been informed speculation that
the main stumbling block to full implementation of the Agree-
ment was a number of civil servants within the Northern Ireland
Office who were hostile to change or wanted to derail the whole
process. 132 Indeed, this speculation has been given substance by
a number of embarrassing and potentially damaging leaks that
have come from within government. One of these leaks related
to the composition of the Patten Commission on Policing and
was seen as particularly embarrassing for the Secretary of State.
The other leak was related to internal discussions on the contro-
versial Orange Order march through the nationalist Garvaghy
Road area. 133 ,
The process has managed to continue despite such opposi-
tion. Although started by the NGOs on the ground, the fact that
this campaign was unprecedented in its success to get human
rights into the political mainstream illustrates the way in which
this agenda managed to mobilize political parties and others.
For a variety of reasons, not all of which are yet possible to dis-
cern accurately, many of the major players in the peace process
picked up the human rights ball and ran with it. Despite a
number of scares, they have not yet dropped it. The focus of
those who wish to see society transformed as a result of the Good
Friday Agreement will be to ensure that they never do.
132. Kevin McNamara, Inattention to Detail on Amendments Could Be Costly, IIsH
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at 10.
133. See Deaglan de Breadun, Leaked Memo Exposes Rift over Police Body, IRsii TIMES,
June 9, 1998, at 8; see also Broken Heads, Dashed Hopes, ECONOMIST, July 12, 1997, at 49.
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